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ABSTRACT
Running parallel to the groundbreaking and historic advancement of LGBTQ
rights over the past decade has been the rise in the prominence and public discourse of
queer conservative thinking. From the Log Cabin Republicans to far-right nationalistic
politics, queer conservatives underscore both diverging ideologies within the modem
American conservative tradition and the increase of far-right politics in Western societies.
This study argues that queer conservatism, while traditionally less explored in the broader
context of sexuality politics. is consequential to an understanding of the LGBTQ
community and queer politics. Thus. an exploration of queer conservatism as a political
ideology is explored. in addition to novel quantitative analyses of this community.
Additionally. theories are offered to explain the rise of far-right nationalistic views within
queer conservatism after the 9/1 l and Pulse nightclub terrorist attacks. This study
concludes that. while queer conservatism is a subset of the LGBTQ community. its
foundations. legacies. and implications are critical to broader discussions of intersections
of sexuality. heteronormativity. race. and post-9/11 politics.
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INTRODUCTION

On June 12. 2016. almost 47 years to the day from the LGBTQ rights movementlaunching Stonewall Riots. a lone gunman opened fire on Pulse nightclub, an LGBTQ
club i n Orlando. Florida. After the over three-hour long standoff between the gunman,
first responders, and negotiators. forty-nine were dead and fifty-three more were
wounded - most of whom were the Latinx attendees of that evening's "Latin Night"
(Rothaus 2016; Stolberg and Perez-Pena 2017). The massacre, being the deadliest act of
1
violence against American LGBTQ people, shook deeply not only the queer community.
but the wider American consciousness as well, as the Pulse massacre was the deadliest
terror1st attack conducted on US soil since 9/11 and, until the Las Vegas shooting in
2017, the deadliest mass shooting in American history.

Though not as common in more contemporary times. violence and disruption
directed at queer people in bars, nightclubs. and other gathering spaces holds a lasting
legacy for lhe LGBTQ community. For decades during the early to mid-twentieth
century, police raids on largely mafia-owned bars were not uncommon as these
f e shops and restaurants where drag
protections were never treated as gospel. nor in cofe

1

A note on language usage in this paper: the term '"queer" is used throughout. Despite
being commonly known as a derogatory term originally used against the LGBTQ
community. "'queer'· has gone through a reclamation process by the gender and sexual
minority community and is now increasingly used within the community. Taken from the
LGBTQ media monitoring organization GLAAD, queer is generally accepted to mean,
··An adjective used by some people . . . whose sexual orientation is not exclusively
heterosexua1.·· GLAAD also notes: '·Some people may use queer. or more commonly
genderqueer. to describe their gender identity and/or gender expression" ("GLAAD'").
..
Finally . GLAAD"s reference guide also stipulates "LGBTQ being the currently accepted
and preferred acronym for the lesbian. gay. bisexual. transgender. queer. plus,
community. Because of the diversity of the LGBTQ community, "queer•· is employed in
this study. --Queer"· is also used to employ the academic sense of the word and non
heteronormative analyses present in this work.
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2
queens, transgender people, and other queer folks gathered (faderman 2015). Indeed. the
Stonewall Riots began in the early hours of June 28, 1 969 primarily as a fight against a
police raid. And more recently, hate crimes committed against LGBTQ individuals at
nightclubs have been documented like the 201 4 case of a man setting fire to a Seattle
nightclub because of his hatred of gays and lesbians (Carter 201 4). Regardless of the
perpetrator's motive, the violence witnessed at Pulse fit entirely too well into the
collective memory of the LGBTQ community.
While the attack on Pulse brought kind words and reaffirmations of support for
the LGBTQ community from world leaders, politicians. and activists (Chan 201 6;
Garunay 201 6; Hunt and Jones 201 6), an unusually impassioned response came from
some unlikely sorts: conservatives. While many criticisms were levied at right-wing
religious leaders' reactions to the shooting (Bever 201 6) and the nwnber of Republican
Congressmen leaving out the LGBTQ community in their remarks about Pulse (Weigel

201 6), some on the right were much more explicit in both their mention and support for
the LGBTQ community.
Notably, then-candidate Donald Trump made specific overtures to the queer
community in his first presidential campaign rally following the shooting. stating: "We
want to live in a country where gay and lesbian Americans and all Americans are safe
from radical lslam, which, by the way, wants to murder and has murdered gays and they
enslave women" (Corasaniti 201 6). Trump doubled down on these remarks in his

2

The queer community and the various mafias had a curious rapport with one another
during this time, as the mafias could pay off police officers to ward off potential raids on
their establishments. allowing the LGBTQ community a place of somewhat more security
than other establishments they would otherwise attend.
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nomination acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention - only a few
weeks after the Pulse shooting - declaring: "As your president, J will do everything i n my
power to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful
foreign ideology" (Johnson 2016). These remarks were historic in that Trump became the
first Republjcan presidential nominee to offer words of support for the LGBTQ
community in a nomination acceptance speech.
Yet. Trump was not the only vocal and visible member of the right to comment on
the Pulse shooting. the queer community. and radical Islamic terrorism. The alt-right3 and
gay provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos wrote an article for the right-wing media outlet
Breitbart the day of the attack titled "The Left Chose Islam Over Gays, Now 100 People
Are Dead or Maimed in Orlando'" ( Yiannopoulos 2016). Meanwhile, other neo-Nazi and
historically homophobic individuals and organizations began spreading Islamophobic
messages of support for the LGBTQ community (Falvey 2016). The overt critiques of
Islam in the comments of Trump. Yiannopoulos. and others on the right cannot be
understated. for they represent one of the most singular ties between traditionally
homophobic and transphobic groups. and segments of the LGBTQ community.
The increasing political science literature investigating sexuality politics has
provided many critical insights into the community. Several studies have highlighted that
the majority of the LGBTQ community has traditionally voted Democratic and generally
identify as liberal (Black et al 2000; Lewis et al 2011; Perrella et al 2012; Schnabel 2018;

3 The term "alt-right" was popularized by one the movement"s founders and leading
members Richard Spencer. While still somewhat loosely understood, the alt-right is
generally understood to be those supporting far-right nationalistic, white supremacist, and
anti-Semitic politics (Stack 2018).
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Sherrill 1996). Other research has considered the interactions of LGBTQ rights issues on
both general and LGBTQ-specific voting behavior (Abramowitz 2004; Hillygus and
Shields 2005; Lewis 2005; Mulligan 2008; Smith et al 2006). However, due often to data
limitations on the political ideologies, thoughts, and behaviors of the community. and the
generally nascent and sometimes zeitgeist-focused nature of sexuality politics, research
on the LGBTQ community has sometimes been l imited in scope and purpose. Too often,
LGBTQ individuals are treated as variables in social science research instead of being the
focus of said research - or, as this study seeks to underscore. the community is treated as
a monolith in our general and academic discussions.
Thus, when seeking to better understand the political beliefs of the LGBTQ
community. it is necessary to dig beyond first-order questions typified by simple
descriptive studies. Exploring queer conservatism is one route to this goal. Queer politics
has not been immune to the growing tides of far-right fascination, populism, and
nationalism over at least the past decade. Research is beginning to note what this tide
looks like and how it is impacting broader politics (Bakker et al 2016; Bonikowski 2016;
Snyder 2003). Evidenced by Trump. Yiannopoulos, and others to be expanded upon.
many on the right are evolving their stances on sexuality issues for their political gain,
and the queer community is doing just the same. Queer conservatism is particularly
fascinating due to its intersection with beliefs often seen by the mainstream LGBTQ
community as antithetical to their rights. Additionally, queer conservatism presents a
newer and pronounced usage of one's sexuality as a vehicle for politicaJ expression. and
the greater complexity with which queer conservatism shades ongoing explorations of
far-right populism and nationalism.
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Yet, most importantly . better understanding queer conservatism allows for a better
understanding of the queer community. This community is notably one of the most
diverse minority communities with its many intersections of multiple sexualities and
genders, as well as racial, class. and certainly ideological distinctions (Ferris 2006).
Obviously, queer conservatism has always existed. However. as will be argued in this
study, even after the founding of conservative LGBTQ political organizations like the
Log Cabin Republicans in 1978 (the first specifically-conservative LGBTQ political
organization in the United States; "Our History") or GOProud in 2009 (a slightly more
conservative organization than the LCRs; Zeller 20 l 0). queer conservatism has largely
been left out of both political science and historiographical surveys of the LGBTQ
community.
Another justification comes from the political power held by the LGBTQ
community and the conservatives within. As Gates (2012) explains in his report for the
Williams Institute at UCLA. the 2012 LGBTQ vote was Iikely enough to swing the
election in favor of President Obama. as the LGBTQ vote in Ohio and Florida - key
swing states - appeared enough to push those states into Obama·s corner. This
importance is magnified considering 27% of the LGBTQ community voted for .John
McCain in the 2008 election (Huang et al 2016 ). Moreover. Donald Trump received only
14% of the LGBT vote - the lowest vote share among Republican nominees since 1992
(Huang et al. 2016). At face value . it appears Trump·s historic inclusion of LGBTQ
rights in his platform and rhetoric did not help him gain votes from the LGBTQ
population.
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Combining President Trump's historically low vote share among the queer
community with the rise of more radically nationalist members exemplifies the need to
better understand this segment of the LGBTQ community. Thus, this research proposes
most simply the question: "What does queer conservatism look like?" Even though the
question may be simplistic, the routes to answering are anything but.
To answer, this study is designed as follows: first, queer conservatism as an
ideology is dissected, highlighting the differences between traditional and newer
narratives; next findings from quantitative analysis using the 2016 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study are discussed: then, theories of homonationalism are
offered for greater context and exploration; and finally, broader discussions surrounding
the research question and data are presented.
A note on source material is important to include. While the foundational research
for this study comes from scholarly works, many other sources come from news articles,
video interviews published on YouTube. and other less traditional arenas. Because an
examination of queer conservatism requires research on the fast-changing nature of this
LGBTQ subgroup. and because this subgroup is one not yet frequently explored by
political scientists or other scholars in published works, research outside of traditional
areas of scholarship is both necessary and important. Every effort has been made to
include reputable news and media outlets, and to approach even biased sources from an
objective standpoint.

1]

UNDERSTANDING QUEER CONSERVATISM

To begin exploring the politics of the LGBTQ right, i t is important first to
establish understood definitions. The ideologies discussed in this work are based more in
contemporary understandings of conservatism. Focuses on tradition and hierarchy. law
and-order, largely Christian oriented, and a heavy importance placed on small
governments are at the root of these ideologies (Schneider 2009). While conservatism i n
America i s very diverse with deviations like morality-centered Christian conservatives.
and so-called Country Club Republicans focused mostly on low taxes, fewer regulations.
and a generally pro-business approach to politics, there are two distinct branches of
conservatism found within the queer community: neoconservatism and
paleoconservatism, or what may be more broadly understood as nationalism and the
ideology most often employed by the alt-right.
Neoconservatism is often defined by spreading traditional American democracy
around the globe and places a greater importance on US foreign affairs (VaYsse 2010 ).
Paleoconservatism is broadly understood as those conservatives concerned with the
protection of a Western identity through greater economic and political nationalism. a
restriction on immigration. and a central focus on traditional social policies and norms
formulated around religious. ethnic, and national identities (Foley 2007). Scaling back
US military intervention abroad often is also encapsulated in paleoconservatism. seen
through many in the Tea Party (Skocpol and Williamson 2013).
Just as these splits exist among mainstream conservatism. so too do they occur
within queer conservatism. Thus. in this exploration of queer conservatism . this section
seeks first to trace the political foundations and evolutions of conservatism within the
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queer community. This section will also place the evolutions and ideologies of the queer
right into a broader frame found within general treatments of the LGBTQ rights
movement and its political organizations. Understandably. because the majority of
LGBTQ people lean towards more liberal ideologies, much of the history and political
treatment of the rights movement has focused more on the primarily left-leaning
organizations like the Human Rights Campaign. Freedom to Marry. the Gay Liberation
Front, and the Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (Faderman 2015; Stryker 2017).
Political differences among left-leaning queer rights groups have existed since
even the early Homophile movement of the 1950s. Historians and political scientists have
noted this distinction as being assimilationist versus liberationist (Faderman 2015:
Rimmerman 2002; Rimmerman 2008). It is exactly this frame. assimilation or liberation.
which can be applied also to the politics and organizations of the queer right.
Rimrnerman (2008) summarizes assimilationist LGBTQ politics as stressing the
inherent sameness of queer and straight people. Put another way. the only difference
between gay and straight America is the gender of one· s romantic and/or sexual
partner(s). Moreover, as society generally better understands that sexuality exists on a
spectrum. this difference is barely one at all. Huntington (2015) perhaps best exemplifies
the assimilationist narrative through her dissection of the same-sex marriage fight
culminating in legalization via the Supreme Court case Oberge_fell ,.. Hodges: just like
heterosexual relationships. same-gender relationships are loving. committed

relationships. and same-gender couples possess the same ability as heterosexual couples
to raise their children.
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Conversely. liberationist thinking argues for the acceptance of queer people as a
distinct cultural minority. Whaf s more. liberationists identify the most important political
struggle as against heteronormativit/ rather than only fighting for civil equality among
queer and straight society. This struggle stems from the belief that queer culture cannot
exist under straight society so Jong as heteronormativity dominates our norms and politics
(Rimmerman 2008). To simplify. liberationists advocate an accepted difference i n society
akin to, though not exactly like, distinctions of race or gender.
Due to the longer history of the LGBTQ rights movement based primarily on the
left. it i s understandable that the assimilationist and liberationist frame has been well
established in LGBTQ scholarship. Yet, as will be discussed in greater detail below,
recent evolutions within queer conservative thinking also fit within this frame. Thus. if
we are to understand queer conservatism. it is crucial to understand the ways in which a
queer person's sexuality intersects with. informs. and impacts their politics.
Naturally . this intersection yields different results for different people. So. in
seeking to better understand the politics of queer conservatism, it is necessary to trace
this ideology from the first and largest conservative LGBTQ organization. the Log Cabin
Republicans (hereafter '"LCRs'"). then turn to the rising levels of right-wing nationalist
and white supremacist thinking (aka '·alt-right" thinking) present in queer conservatism.

4

Schilt and Westbrook define heteronormativity as ""the suite of cultural. legal, and
institutional practices that maintain normative assumptions that there are two and only
two genders. that gender reflects biological sex. and that only sexual attraction between
these · opposite· genders is natural or acceptable·· (2009. 441).
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The Log Cabin Republicans and Mainstream Queer Conservatism

As noted above. queer conservatism can generally be understood in two
camps - neoconservatism and paleoconservatism. The largest and most pervasive
version of queer conservatism is rooted i n neoconservatism and the conservative
wave introduced by President Reagan. Take. for example. Guy Benson. a frequent
commentator on Fox News and political editor of the conservative webpage and
magazine Townhall. Benson argues that his sexuality is only one facet of his

personhood. and that he cares more about traditionally conservative values like a
small government. defense of the free market. and a strong military than he does
about defining h i s politics solely on LGBTQ issues ( PragerU 20 1 8 ). This argument
is one believed and employed by similar LGBTQ conservative thinkers and
commentators like Dave Rubin, entrepreneur Peter Thiel. and President of the Log

Cabin Republicans Gregory T. Angelo (Drabold 20 1 6; Lloyd 20 1 6: Riley 20 1 7) .
I t i s through the Log Cabin Republicans that classical queer conservatism can best
be understood. As their website explains, the LCRs began as a fledgling group of gay
conservatives opposed to what became known as the Briggs Initiative ('"Our History"').
Officially known as California Proposition 6, the Initiative. spearheaded by California
state senator John Briggs, was a 1978 California referendum which. if passed. would
have banned gays and lesbians from teaching in public schools and would have allowed
for the firing of any teacher found to be advocating for or supportive of gay and lesbian
people (Rimmerman 2002). The initiative came in the wake of general backlash against
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the LGBTQ rights movement when many in the wider public believed exposing children
to homosexuals could cause the kids to become gay. or that they may contract HIVIAIDS
(Griffin and Ouellett 2003). As the LCRs note, initial polling on the initiative showed the
Proposition favored 61% to 31% ("Our History"). Due to the hesitancy of many
Californian Republicans and Democrats to fight the issue. many gay conservatives, gay
liberals like Harvey Milk, and their allies rose to the challenge (McKinley 2008).
Specifically, gay conservatives in California chose to lobby key policy elites like
former Governor and Presidential-hopeful Ronald Reagan. After successful lobbying
efforts, Reagan wrote a November 151 editorial in the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner
lambasting the Proposition. saying it '·is not needed to protect our children,'' and, "it has
the potential for real mischief. What if an overwrought youngster. disappointed by bad
grades, imagined it was the teacher"s fault and struck out by accusing the teacher of
..
advocating homosexuality? Innocent lives could be ruined (Reagan 1978. 19).
Due to the efforts of these gay activists. Republican and Democrat ali ke. several
political elites, like Reagan. rallied against the Proposition including former President
Ford. then-Governor Jerry Brown. and eventually. then-President Carter (LeVay and
Nonas 1997). As a result. instead of the Proposition passing 61-31. it failed 58-41. with
over a million more Californians voting against the Initiative (School Employees 1 978).
In response . those gay conservatives officially formed the Log Cabin Republicans (''Our
..
History ).
Since their inception and subsequent growth, the LCRs have focused on
traditionally conservative ideals. As they explain, .. Log Cabin Republicans are LGBT
Republicans and straight allies who support equality under the law for all. free markets,
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individual li berty. limited government. and a strong national defense" ("About Us .').
Additionally, they note that the LCRs ''believe equality for LGBT Americans is in the
finest tradition of the Republican Party.'' They "educate (their] Party about why inclusion
wins. Opposing LGBT equality is inconsistent with the GO P's core principles of smaller
government and personal freedom:· In 2012. the LCRs boasted 45.000 members an<l 44
chapters (Shapiro 2012� recent membership numbers have proven very difficult to find,
as the LCRs do not usually publicize these figures).
The LCR fight for both traditional Republican values and the inclusion of
LGBTQ rights within the Republican Party has led the organization to many battles
largely within the Republican Party. The LCRs· next major battle post-Briggs Initiative
came after Pat Buchanan· s 1992 ''culture war'' speech at the Republican National
Convention. ln response to Buchanan's statements disparaging LGBTQ rights in what he
called ..a fight for the soul of America" (Buchanan 1992), and responding more generally

to President George H. W. Bush· s loss in 1992. the LCRs increased both their lobbying

efforts and their attempts to unify the Republican party around a winning strategy ("Our
History.. )

.

It was at this point when the operationalization of the LCRs' politics became
increasingly succinct. Throughout the 1990s, the LCRs attempted to make in-roads with
the Republican establishment. As the LCRs claim. their efforts led to many Republican
lawmakers and elites such as Governor George Pataki of New York . Los Angeles Mayor
Richard Riordan and New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani becoming "leading voices of
inclusion and liberty'· ( ..Our History''). However. their efforts during this decade are
notably more complicated than the organization claims.
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The LGBTQ rights struggle during the 1 990s is often painted as one facing
intense backlash against not only the general rights movement but broader social equality
movements as well (Faderman 2015). The strengthening of the Religious Right over the
course of the 1 980s into the 1 990s led to the sort of ·'culture war'· described by Buchanan
(Rimmerman 2008). So, to continue increasing their leverage within the party, the LCRs·
leadership disavowed as well as they could the stereotypical image of the gay community
during those decades.
As Rogers and Lott (1997) explain, it's unsurprising that throughout the LCRs·
lobbying Republican elites. the organization frequently drew ''sharp rhetorical boundaries
between themselves and those individuals deemed part of the ·gay establishment" or
associated with libertine lifestyles, queer theory. or direct action. confrontational politics··
(500). This shirking of the image of the sexually liberal and radical gay was seen as an
advantage by many in the LCRs during the '90s. One president of the Los Angeles club
noted. ·'when [other Republicans] see that we· re sitting at the table and not wearing
leather jockstraps, their whole image of gays and lesbians will shift" (Rogers and Lott
1 997, 500). I n a similar vein are the remarks of Andy Smith, president of the Austin.
Texas club, emphasizing that the LCRs ·'have to educate people that we are not left-wing.
earring-wearing liberals" (Rogers and Lott 1997. 500). And another member of the
LCRs. Jesse Walters, remarked "I think [campaign officials] were afraid we were going
to be a crowd of radical leather men or drag queens"' (Rogers and Lott 1 997, 500-501 ).
The LCRs appeared to have gained even greater victories for inclusiveness
during the early 2000s and the election of President George W. Bush. As they note. then
candidate Bush met with a group of gay conservatives. expressed his admiration for
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hearing their stories, and the LCRs note the lack of anti-gay rhetoric in the 2000 general
election ("Our History"). Moreover, President Bush's 2003 announcement of a$ l 5

billion commitment to combat the global AIDS epidemic was celebrated by the LCRs
("Our History''). Others have noted. however. that Bush's announcement coincided
coincidentally with the launching of the Iraq war (Dietrich 2007), and that the President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PREPFAR, included stipulations that up to a third of
the $15 billion be reserved for abstinence-only prevention, a method discouraged by
doctors and activists involved in the global AIDS epidemic (Cohen 2007). Regardless,
Bush's launching of PREPFAR was seen as a victory among the LCRs. the LGBTQ
right, and the broader queer community.
While the early years of President Bush's first term appeared somewhat fruitful
for the LCRs' mission. by 2003 the optimism smTounding the compassionate
conservative·s agenda faded. In June 2003. The US Supreme Court struck down Texas·
sodomy law in the Lawrence v. Texas case. overturning the Court's 1 986 ruling
upholding Georgia's similar law in Bowers v. Hardwick (Spindelman 2004). And, in
2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health that the state's civil marriage laws could not discriminate based on sex. making
Massachusetts the first state in the country to legalize same-sex marriage (Wegman
2015). Despite these monumental gains for the LGBTQ community, the public and
political backlash was swift.
Even before the Lawrence and Goodridge cases, social conservatives sought a
constitutional amendment defining marriage as being strictly between a man and a
woman (Rimmerman 2008). As the LCRs describe. though President Bush sidestepped
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the issue of marriage equality and a constitutional amendment in the initial months
following these high-profile rulings, his appointment of very conservative federal judges
1ike the recess appointment of anti-gay Alabama Attorney General Wi Iii am Pryor made it

clear that Bush would endorse the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA; "Our History").
He did just that in February 2004.
instead of applying a purely "sameness" argument or arguing about the inherent
nature of same-gender relationships, the LCRs criticized the FMA on what they believed
are tenants of the Republican Party: a focus on federalism, state autonomy, and liberty
("Our History"). In response to the Amendment, the LCRs launched a $ 1 million
lobbying and advertising campaign (..Our History"). With that funding, the LCRs
conducted a national opinion poll to measure public attitudes about civil unions, same
sex marriage. and the proposed FMA. Their data culminated i n an advertising campaign
with a television ad featuring Vice President Cheney's rejection of a federal marriage
amendment at the 2000 Vice Presidential Debate, and targeted lawmakers in Washington
D.C. and key states in 2004 like Missouri, Ohio. Florida. Arizona. and Texas.
Gauging the LCRs· impact on the FMA debate is difficult. Despite spending over
$ 1 million on the issue and claiming that the House and Senate '"overwhelmingly
rejected'' the amendments ("Our History"). the final vote tally was 227 to 1 86 in the
House (short of the 290 needed; Musgrave 2004) and 50 against to 48 in favor in the
Senate (shy of the 60 votes needed; Allard 2004). Even though the FMA was defeated.
the debate would prove highly divisive not only for the nation, but for the LCRs as welt.
In what was called by many pundits a "referendum on values" (Mulligan 2008,
1 09). the 2004 General Election was the first major outlet for public backlash against
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LGBTQ rights post-Lawrence and Goodridge. While the impact of moral issues like

abortion and same-sex marriage has been contextualized and lessened by scholars since
the 2004 election (Abramowitz 2004; Hillygus and Shields 2005), the electoral outcomes
were clear. 1 l states ratified marriage amendments to their state constitutions, and
President Bush won reelection (Smith et al 2006). Just as the nation was divided on the
question of same-sex marriage so were the LC Rs. For the first time since the 1992
,

Presidential Election, the LCRs voted not to endorse the Republican candidate (Anderson
2004).
Withholding their support for President Bush · s re-election did not keep the LC Rs
from continuing their mission of changing attitudes both within and outside of the

Republican Party. In 2008, the LCRs endorsed John McCain in that year·s General
Election largely because of his opposition to the FMA. and they endorsed Romney in
2012 (Jacobson 2008; '·With Endorsement" 2012). The LCRs defended their
endorsement of anti-LGBTQ Romney over President Obama. who had by 2012 expressed
his support for same-sex marriage. by emphasizing the '·gravity of the economic and
national security issues currently at stake." The LC Rs also noted in the press release of
their endorsement their optimi sm would eventually support the pro-LGBTQ Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (Shapiro 2012).

In 2016. the LCR leadership decided not to endorse any candidate. though their
President Gregory T. Angelo has been very supportive of President Trump since his
victory. with Angelo describing Trump as "the most pro-LGBT Republican president in

history'· (Signorile 2018). This move has understandably been met with some ire. as
President Trump has proposed a ban on transgender Americans serving openly in the
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armed forces and many in his cabinet like Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos and
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar have invoked religious liberty
arguments allowing the denial of service to individuals with beliefs or lifestyles which
may go against one's religious beliefs - moves deeply concerning to the queer
community (Signorile 20 I 7).

Notably . the LCRs have consistently employed much more centrist politics than

others in the Party. Rogers and Lott ( 1 997) note that from the early days of the

organization. the LCRs have professed the guiding Republican principles of a free market
economy. individual liberties, and strong foreign policy. Rogers and Lott also add that.
despite the "big tent" nature of the GOP and their claimed inclusiveness of multiple
viewpoints. the LCRs have frequently and understandably been at odds with the Christian
Right. Though the LCRs have never explicitly called the religious right their enemies,

they obviously share political differences. Moreover. in 2004. then political director of
the LCRs Patrick Guerriero stressed to other LCR members the importance of attending
the 2004 Republican National Convention (even though they did not endorse President
Bush) because they needed to "make it clear that we are loyal Republicans.'' Guerriero
also saw the convention as an opportunity to show both the GOP and the country that
there are "thoughtful. conservative gay Republicans.'' Yet. Guerriero also noted that if
they do not do so . ..the far right will be able to claim it as their convention" (Anderson
2 004).
This centrism is evident also in the LCRs· approach to high-profile LGBTQ
issues throughout their existence. While the LCRs state their core principles are those of
the Republican party - a focus on individual liberties. small government. free market
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capitalism, and a strong national defense - their lobbying and political efforts exist in a
gray area between advocating staunchly for these principles while also taking actions
more in the traditional center. Take the issue leading to the LCRs' founding, the Briggs
Initiative. The entire basis for the LCRs' opposition to the law potentially banning
LGBTQ people from teaching was a privacy argument and individual liberties argument:
LGBTQ people are perfectly fit to be teachers, and what they do outside of the school
walls isn't relevant to their professional ability. This argument can easily be interpreted
as a classically conservative. civil liberties interpretation of one's right to privacy.
Yet, two of the most important LGBTQ issues of the 2151 century. Don·t Ask.
Don't Tell (DADT) and the Obergefell v.

Hodges case legalizing same-sex marriage,

highlight how the LCRs have often moved to more centrist politics. The LCRs
successfully argued before the federal courts i n 20 I 0 that DADT violated queer service
members · First Amendment rights to free expression and Fifth Amendment rights to due
process (Schwartz 20 I 0). Additionally. the LCRs' partner think tank Liberty Education
Forum filed an amicus brief for the Obergefell v. Hodges case arguing that san1e-sex
marriage should be legalized not on the "sameness" argument of same-sex loving
relationships and parenting as was commonly argued. Instead. Liberty Education Forum
used discrimination evident in spousal exemptions in campaign donation Jaws - Jaws like

Citizens United which conservative Justices at the time Alito, Thomas. and Scalia
supported - to demonstrate existing discrimination against LGBTQ partners (Nelson
2015).

To be sure. the LCRs approach to these legal challenges fit within the Republican
frame. Their challenge to DADT was one of furthering constitutional protections for

23

queer service members, and the Liberty Education Forum· s brief challenged the Supreme
Court to apply the decisions it had made to every partnership. hetero or homosexual.
However, the DADT challenge also fits squarely within the "'sameness'· narrative offered
by many left-leaning LGBTQ organizations, and the Liberty Education Forum decided to
make their campaign donation argument to separate them from so many others making
"sameness" arguments for same-sex marriage and parenting rights. a position they and
the LCRs agreed with (Nelson 2015).
Yet, at its core, these challenges, as well as the LCRs' commitment to lobbying
Republican elites and attempting to change the party from the inside underscore how the
operationalization of a group's mission may differ from the ideological core they
espouse. The LCRs challenged DADT and marriage discrimination in the courts. Many
others on the right, especially religious conservatives. have lambasted the Supreme Court
and other federal and state courts as being filled with activist judges creating social
change without the consent of the democratic populace - though it should be noted these
criticisms have been levied against conservative Supreme Court Justices as well (Young
2002; Schaller 2009). Much of the 2151 century queer rights struggle has been fought in

the courts instead of solely through lobbying or changing public opinion (Faderman
2015). In fighting for greater LGBTQ rights via higher cou11s. the LCRs have often left

behind their focus on small government and states· rights in favor of sweeping change
augmenting the civil rights of their queer constituency.
Finally, the LCRs have frequently been at odds with the Republican Pa11y's
platform. Despite positive words about President Trump from LCR President Gregory T.
Angelo and Trump's remarks at the 2016 Republican National Convention (Johnson
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2 0 1 6), the Republican Party adopted many anti-LGBTQ planks to its 201 6 platform
including reaffirming marriage between a man and a woman, loosely supporting so-called
"conversion therapy'' for queer youth. and doubling down on discrimination against
transgender people through the ..bathroom bill" debates (Peters 201 8). Moreover, the
LCRs have frequently taken a neutral position on other hot button social issues like
abortion (''Log Cabin·· 1 999; Shapiro 20 I 2a).
This centrism has placed the LCRs in the crosshairs of queer conservatism. In
2009. Christopher R. Barron. then-national political director of the LCRs, and Jimmy
LaSilva. then-director of programs and policy for the same group. left the Log Cabin to
form GO Proud. an organization of queer Republicans disillusioned with the centrism of
the LCRs (McGum 2009). Although GOProud folded in 20 I 4. the group represented an
important split from the LCRs, who had previously dominated queer right representation.
GO Proud represented a number of queer conservatives who believed that advocating for
stricter tax relief and employing a similar ideology to the rising tide of Tea Party
conservatism would aid both America and specifically the queer community (Shapiro
2012b).
Additionally. GOProud viewed the LCRs· platform as too focused on social
issues like same-sex marriage. GOProud was supportive of same-sex marriage. but
believed it to be a matter only for the states to decide. going against the more national
focus of the LC Rs (Zeller 2010). Moreover. whereas the LC Rs have traditionally not
taken a stance on other social issues like abortion. GOProud was staunchly pro-life
(McGurn 2009). However. beyond a more state-level focused politics and some
deviations on policy. GOProud did not have many grand splits with the LCR. Yet. despite
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GOProud's relatively short existence, the organization was arguably the first among the
queer right to break away from assimilationist, elite-focused actions of the LCRs. For
these reasons. GOProud was an important blip and an even more important precursor to
what would soon follow.
Tile Queer Far-Right and LGBTQ Politics

Shakespeare ·s adage "misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows·· is perhaps
one of the most apt ways to approach queer individuals on the far right and their
relationship with traditionally homophobic, transphobic, and nationalistic organizations.
If one were to update Shakespeare's words. the phrase may go something like '"terrorism
acquaints a man with strange bedfellows;' for it is almost entirely around the issue of
radical Islamic terrorism that recent evolutions in queer conservatism is found. This
exploration into the nationalistic evolutions among queer conservatives begins with a few
caveats.
First, because voices among the radical right in queer politics have only recently
gained attention on the mainstream level. finding and understanding their beliefs is a bit
difficult. Additionally. the queer far-right is a small subset of an already small subset of
the LGBTQ population. It is likely anywhere between 20 and 30 percent of queer people
identify as conservative (Huang et al 2016). In 20 1 7. GaJlup released updated numbers on
the American LGBTQ population, estimating 4.3% of adults. or 1 0 million Americans.
identify as LGBTQ. Thus. combining these numbers with voting data places the
estimated queer conservative population between 2 and 3 million Americans.
Yet, despite their size and a lack of hard data on this group, they are nonetheless
important to examine. for the queer alt-right contextualizes both queer and straight
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politics. What's more, the performance of one·s sexuality in the political sphere within
the queer far-right is as novel as it is important. So, this section will explain the queer far
right through the lens of some of its most impo11ant, popular, and impactful practitioners.
Pinning down the specifics of the queer far-right is admittedly difficult. As
elements of the far-right like the alt-right have risen and popularized. the definition of the
alt-right has changed as it has solidified. As the Anti-Defamation League explain, core
tenants of the alt-right specifically include racism and anti-Semitism ("From Alt Right").
However, as the alt-right and its leaders like Richard Spencer rose to prominence, many
who are not necessarily racist or anti-Semitic subscribed to the ideology because they
viewed it as the anti-establishment conservative group. Lucian Wintrich. a prominent far
right gay journalist and White House correspondent for the Gateway Pundit. has
expressed such beliefs and how he and others like Milo Yiannopoulos no longer associate
with the alt-right. Instead, they fall under the category of "alt-lite"' (.. From Alt Righf').
The major difference between the alt-right and alt-lite is that. in the words of alt
right writer and white supremacist

Greg .Johnson . ..The alt-lite is defined by civic

nationalism as opposed to racial nationalism" ("From Alt Right'l This distinction, while
often difficult to nail down amongst far-right nationalists, is important to understand
because the queer far-right exists in both camps. Lucian Wintrich and Milo Yiannopoulos
are perhaps the most popular gay members of the alt-lite. whereas writers and activists
like James J. O'Meara and Jack Donovan are popular among the white nationalist alt
right (Minkowitz 201 7).

Regardless of differing beliefs on creating an American or Western ethnostate, the

queer far-right shares far more in common than they do disagreements. Opposition to
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immigration and Islamic extremism are strong features of this ideology (Minkowitz
2017). Additionally. many in the queer far-right take great issue with identity politics and
political correctness. Indeed, so-called PC culture is Yiannopoulos' biggest target.
Moreover, many in these camps. instead of labeling themselves as conservative, alt-right,
or alt-lite, often don the term ..cultural libertarian·' (Rubin Report 201 5). This ideology is
often defined by the belief that people should be free from the dictates of cultural norms,
thus explaining why issues of political correctness and ideologies challenged generally
accepted power structures are seen as threatening. Shirking commonly understood or
mainstream ideological monikers is another facet of both queer and general alt-right or
alt-lite ideals.
Part of this phenomenon can be explained by the inherent anti-establishment
nature of these far-right groups. However. when looking specifically to queer people in
these spaces. the fluidity among these political ideals becomes starker. Yiannopoulos,
while never being one to specifically label himself part of the alt-lite, expresses the exact
views shared by the group. Moreover. Yiannopoulos has stated that his biggest concerns
are about pop culture and free speech. but has said the only reason he talks politics is
because of President Trump (Stein 201 6). And in 2016. Lucian Wintrich rose to
prominence over his controversial photoshoot '·Twinks4Trump" which featured scantily
clad. young gay men wearing Trump's '"Make America Great Again'· hats (Sopelsa
2017).
Discussing the ideologies of far-right queer conservatives is important. but l argue
not crucial to understanding the significance and novelty of those like Yiannopoulos and
Wintrich. Just as mainstream conservative queer people have always existed, so too have
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those LGBTQ people more far-right inclined. What is new, different. and telling is the
way many on the far-right utilize their sexuality as a political tool. Moreover. their using
their sexuality as a distinct part of their politics is akin to liberationist thinking as
discussed above.
Earlier. I noted that the assimilationist and liberationist frame has been widely
employed through both historical and political accounts of the tension among the queer
left. Such a tension . though more than likely there in some form. has never been this
explicit on the queer right. The Log Cabin Republicans have always fit squarely within
the assimilationist camp. By arguing for sameness and equality in civil law while also
placing great importance on looking or acting nothing like the stereotypical libertine gay .
the LCRs from their founding to present day have employed the same political tactics as
the assimilationist. mainstream queer left (Rogers and Lott 1 997; Signorile 201 8). Put
..
another way . the LCRs believe they are already in the big tent" and are only trying to
make it that much bigger.
Conversely, the queer far-right see themselves as more anti-establishment. The
very fact that they use titles like alt-right and alt-lite instead of Republican is just one
indication. Moreover. they frequently use their sexuality as justification and as a tool for
their politics. Yiannopoulos has criticized same-sex marriage not with a religious
argument or one seeking to maintain the social hierarchy of heterosexual marriage.
Instead. Yiannopoulos has been against same-sex marriage because to him. being queer is
a license to break away from the mainstream and live a freer lifestyle (Rubin Report
2015). Or in other words. Yiannopoulos argues for queerness. free speech . and free

society as a place for gay people to live outside of heteronormative assumptions. Rather
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than advocating for LGBTQ people·s strict inclusion i n society . Yiannopoulos and others
view their queerness as defining their personhood and politics. and because society i n
many ways still etherizes the LGBTQ community. queer people have greater freedom to
explore life, politics, and interactions with society in ways traditionally associated with
being abnormal.
Lucian Wintrich also serves as an example of using one· s sexuality to advocate
for conservative politics. Wintrich is a staunch Trump supporter and free speech advocate
who gained his notoriety through the controversial and highly sexualized
"Twinks4Trump" photoshoot, a photoshoot he was later fired for (VICE News 201 7).
Instead of featuring gay men in the classic suit and tie - in other words, Log Cabin
Republicans - Wintrich uses blatant queer overtones to advocate a political message. It is
in the performance and operationalization of the queer far-right" s politics that place them
very much in the vein of liberationism.
The debates between assimilationism and liberationism on the left have largely
defined how the LGBTQ rights struggle has operated (Rimmerman 2008). Whether it be
the assimilationists lobbying political elites for change or fighting most of the legal battle
in the courts, or the liberationists using more direct-action protest tactics. the history of
the LGBTQ rights movement in the United States has exemplified the success of
assimilationist tactics (Faderman 2 0 1 5 . What remains to be seen now is the ways in
which the queer far-right and their more liberationist anti-establishment views play out
their political struggle. The LCRs have made inroads within the GOP through their
lobbying efforts and they played a key role in overturning DADT through their legal
challenge. Yet. the nascence of the queer far-right leaves more questions than predictions.
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It is important to point out that. o�jectively. the LCRs helped open the door for queer
people·s acceptance in the far-right. However. because of the far-right's anti
establishment beliefs, there is much tension between the queer far-right and mainstream
queer conservatives beyond core policy priorities.
The similarities between the queer liberationist left and right cxi::;t onJy in the
ways they frame their sexuality as political and treat the idea of queer existence in
society. The liberationist left like the Gay Liberation Front emerged during the explosive
rise of the gay rights movement after the Stonewall Riots in 1 969, and their main cause
was queer liberation (Faderman 2015). The ideological priorities of the queer far-right are
tied much more to their general political beliefs than on a single issue like civil
protections. The alt-right and similar organizations only began courting likeminded queer
conservatives after the Obergefell v. Hodges case legalizing same-sex marriage in 201 5
("Youth 2015). Simply put. the queer far-right has risen more so after the major rights
..

battles were won. So. while the queer far-right's main political objectives may not be
solely about LGBTQ politics. they do benefit from a smaller barrier to entry and a far
right movement whose leaders at least want them in the fold.
Finally. because so much of the queer far-right's politics are wrapped in the
current wave of populist nationalism. the movement generally has suffered growing
pains. The split between the alt-right and the alt-lite underscores the instability still
somewhat prevalent among this wing of conservatives. How long the nationalist
mentality will exist in American politics is unknown. The important question when
thinking about the LGBTQ people in the far-right is whether their sexual politics will
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evolve as nativist debates continue raging, and if they will linger or change entirely
when/if the nationalistic pendulum swings the other way?
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DATA AND ANALYSIS
Analyzing the rhetoric and purported beliefs of queer conservatives is only one
way to explore the range of political thought among this subgroup. Quantitative analysis
of their demographic breakdowns and political opinions helps complete the picture. In
this section, I will utilize the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The CCES
dataset from 2016 provides a unique insight into the LGBTQ community, as its inclusion
of sexual orientation and gender identity questions lends a sample of 5,1 1 7 self-identified
LGBTQ people out of the 64,600 respondents. This sample is one of the largest ever of
queer people, allowing for statistical validity when one moves beyond simple
demographic measures of the community. Until the 2016 CCES data, most quantitative
studies surveying LGBTQ people's politics either had samples not large enough to move
confidently beyond first-order questions and/or they did not include transgender
respondents (Black et al 2000; Gates 20 1 1 ; Lewis et al 201 1 ; Sherrill 1996).
Therefore, the 2016 CCES set is useful, important, and insightful as researchers
establish a more up-to-date picture of the LGBTQ community (specifically the
conservatives) and make inferences about queer conservatism. This section begins with a
description of the methods used, starting first with demographic data of both the general
LGBTQ population and the queer conservative sample, then reports political attitudes
among queer conservatives, before finally presenting important findings from regression
and the general analyses.
As noted above, the CCES dataset includes separate questions asking about the
respondent's sexual orientation and gender identity. Often, concerns can be raised about
the accurate representation of LGBTQ people in survey samples, as disclosing this
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information can sometimes be risky or uncomfortable for the respondent. The Williams
Institute at UCLA, which works exclusively on LGBTQ political and legal issues, has
published a best practices guide for sampling LGBTQ people (Badgett 2009). The guide
notes that providing secure and private environments for the survey frequently increases
the rate of accurate self-identification. As Ansolabehere and Schaffuer (2016) explain in
the 2016 dataset's guidebook, all 64,000 respondents were sampled via the internet, thus
lessening potential concerns about accurate self-reporting.
In creating a dataset for queer conservatives, a decision was made to use the
CCES set's 5-point political ideology question instead of the 7-point party identification
question. This decision was made for two reasons: first, there is obviously a difference
been self-identified political ideology and self-identified party affiliation (Abramowitz
and Saunders 1998; Greene 2004; Weinschenk 2010). One does not naturally preclude
support for the other. Second, when one compares the ideology versus the party
affiliation of the LGBTQ community, the results become very mixed. As Graph 1 below
shows, once one moves past the expected Strong Democrat and Very Liberal correlation,
there are strong pockets of independents as well as curious outliers such as
Somewhat/Very Conservative and Strong Democrat (4,1 and 5,1).
Therefore, the political ideology question was utilized for consistency and
because, as noted in the previous section, differences exist between the queer right's
ideology and their support of the Republican Party. So, to analyze the LGBTQ
respondents in the 201 6 CCES dataset, three separate datasets were created. The first
combined the two questions on sexual orientation and gender identity to create a set of
LGBTQ respondents, totaling 5,1 17. Next, an independent sample of only conservative-
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identifying LGBTQ respondents was created. That sample size is 745. Finally, a general
data set of all respondents identifying as conservative on the political ideology scale was
created for comparison, totaling 1 8,688 people.
Graph 1
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Ideology: Left = More Libe..al. Right = l\1orc Conservative

The political ideology scale ranges from 1 =very liberal to 5=very conservative, and the
party identification scale rangesfrom ]=strong Democrat to 7=strong Republican.
To begin, simple demographic data was gathered on the conservative LGBTQ
respondents. These demographics include age, race, gender, education level, family
income, marital status, importance of religion, church attendance, and religious
affiliation. The results are shown below in Table 1 .
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Table 1

Race

Percent

Age
18-24

88

25-34

176

11.8%

145

34-44

White

Percent

23.8% Black
19.5% Hispanic

67

9. 1%

79

I0.6%
2.3%

45-54

90

12.2%Asian

17

55-64

128

17.3% Native American

II

65+

114

I 5.4o/c Middle Eastern

Gender
Male

484

65.2o/c Other

Female

258

34.8o/c

Family Income

I Jo/c

IO

30.0o/i

2
Education

No HS

Percent
65

l.4o/c
0.9%

7

Mixed

Percent

<10,000

74.1%

550

I O.Oo/c HS Graduar.c

Percent
75

I 0.1 o/c

221

29.8o/c

IOk- 19,999

36

5.4o/c Some College

190

25.7o/c

20K - 29,999

63

9.2o/c 2-Ycar

100

13.5o/c

30k - 39,999

96

14.l o/c 4-Ycar

99

13.4o/c

40k- 40,000

84

12.3% Post-Grad

50k- 59,999

47

60k - 69,999

46

70k - 79,999

49

80k - 89,999

7.Oo/c

7.Oo/c Strong Dem

56
Party ID

7.5%o/c
Percent

205

27. 7o/c

7.1 o/c Not V Strong Dem

30

4.0o/c

62

9.0o/c Lean Dem

24

3.2o/c

IOOk- 1 1 9,999

63

9.3o/c Independent

6.2o/c

120k- 149,999

45

6.6o/c Lean Rep

46
!03

13.9o/c

150k- 199,999

12

l.7o/c Not V Strong Rep

124

I 6.7o/c

201

27.1°

200k +

2.0% Stron R

11
Rclig Importance

Religious Dcnom. Percent

Percent

Very

411

55.0o/c Protestant

272

36.6o/c

Somewhat

190

25.6o/c Roman Catholic

239

32.2o/c

15

2.0o/c

Not Very

Not At All

71

9.5o/c Mormon

71

9.5o/cEstrn/Grcck Ortho

Church Attend
>Once a Weck
Once a Weck

Jewish

Percent
107

14.7% Muslim

215

29.4° Buddhist

I or 2 a Month

67

Few Times/Yr

109

9.2% Hindu
15.0° Atbicst

Seldom

119

16.3° Agnostic

Never

112

Married

Marital Status

l 5.3o/cNothing Particular

Somcthin Else

Percent
331

44.7o/c

Separated

15

2.0o/c

Divorced

65

8.8%

Widowed

21

2.8%

274

36.9%

35

4.7o/c

Single
Domestic Partnrsh

5

0.7o/c

15

2.1 o/c

11

1.5o/c

1

0.2o/c

0

0.0°

16

2.2o/c

28

3.8o/c

!03

14.0%

35

4.7o/c

36

Several points on the demographic data are interesting to note. First, the sample of
LGBTQ conservatives are predominantly white men, with 74% of the respondents being
white and 65% male. Compared to the general conservative sample, there is more
diversity among race but fewer women, as the general conservative sample is 8 1 % white
but split 5 1 -49 male and female. When comparing these levels with the general LGBTQ
population, one finds there are fewer white people in the sample, 69%, but the gender gap
is also quite distinct, with 60% men and 40% women.
The age range is also interesting to note. Even accounting for the slight spike of
25-34 year olds in the conservative queer group, there is a decently even split among the

age ranges. The age spread among the general LGBTQ population is fairly similar, with
the same spike occurring around 25-34 year olds and remaining around 1 5-20% through
the remaining ages. However, there notable differences between the queer and general
conservative groups. The general conservative sample includes only 4.5% in the 1 8-24
range, 13% for both the 25-34 and 35-44 ages, a slight spike of 17% for those 45-54, and
5 1 % of the sample makes up those 55 and older. Social attitudes against homosexuality

during the lives of the older members of the conservative population could be one reason
why there are so fewer older queer conservatives. Yet, collapsing the older respondents in
the queer conservative set to 55 and up brings a total of 32%, creating a wider age gap
similar to the general conservative sample.
Turning next to the religion statistics, it is unsurprising to find the majority of
queer conservatives reporting Christian denominations. Both the importance of religion
and church attendance rates are added to measure the religiosity of the sample. Church
attendance is especially important to include, as it is often a better explainer of the impact
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ofreligion on a person's politics (Malka et al 2012). Interestingly, the level of the
importance of religion in queer conservatives' lives is significantly higher than that
reported by the general LGBTQ population, with 80% of conservative queers reporting
very or somewhat importance whereas only 50% of the general LGBTQ population rank
religious importance similarly. But when we compare the queer conservatives with the
general conservative sample, significantly similar results emerge. 82% of the general
conservative sample rate religion as very or somewhat important in their lives.
Finally, the fascinating mix of conservative political ideologies and Democratic
Party affiliation is shown in the party identification scale. 27% of this sample identifies as
a strong Democrat, compared to the almost identical rate for those identifying as a strong
Republican. Expectedly, more respondents identify as some level of Republican. But, the
number of those identifying as strong Democrats is even slightly stronger than those
identifying as strong Republican. Attempting to establish a reason for this phenomenon is
beyond the scope of this research, though an early assumption would be those identifying
as both conservative and strong Democrats perhaps treat LGBTQ issues as their single
issue, therefore identifying with the Democrats and their more pro-LGBTQ platform than
the Republicans.
Also included in the CCES data set are opinion questions asked of every
respondent. Though they are only in a favor/oppose format, they cover several
controversial political issues. Out of the 24 questions covering gun control, immigration,
social issues, and environmental regulations, seven were chosen. These seven were
selected for both their relevance in the 2016 election cycle and because they are
frequently major departure points among liberals and conservatives. The questions as
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well as the responses from the conservative LGBTQ respondents are detailed in Table 2
below.

Table 2

Queer Conservatives: Favor/Oppose. . N = 745
.

•

Background Checks for
All Gun Purchases

Favor
Oppose
Banning Assault Rifles
Favor
Oppose

635
99
357
380

Grant Legal Status to DREAMERS

257
485

Favor
Oppose

Percent

Percent

Percent

ID and Deport Illegal Immigrants Percent

411
330

Favor
Oppose
Abortion Always Legal
Favor
Oppose

384
358

Percent

Gen. Conservatives: Favor/Oppose.
Background Checks for

86% Favor
13% Oppose
49% Favor
51% Oppose

35% Favor
65% Oppose
55% Favor
45% Oppose
52% Favor
48% Oppose

Abortion Only Legal in Cases
of Rape, Incest, life of Mother

Same-Sex Marriage

Percent

492
248

Oppose

Favor
Oppose

451
287

All Gun Purchases

•

N = 18,688

15044
3558

Banning Assault Rifles

8075
10459

Percent

81%
19%

Percent

44%
56%

Grant Legal Status to DREAMERS Percent

5082
13606

27%
72%

ID and Deport Illegal Immigrants Percent

12226
6462

Abortion Always Legal

5946
12723

65%
35%

Percent

32%
68%

Abortion Only Legal in Cases
Percent

Favor

..

66% Favor
33% Oppose
61% Favor
39% Oppose

of Rape, Incest, Life of Mother

Percent

Same-Sex Marriage

Percent

11329
7328

6083
ll418

61%
39%

34%
66%

"Do youfavor/oppose thefollowing proposals? " Responses are ofthe conservative
LGBTQ sample and general conservative sample.
Like the demographic data of the queer conservative sample, there are similarities
and some stark differences between this sample, the LGBTQ, and the general
conservative respondents. Taking all questions into account, the queer conservative
sample appears somewhat centrist to liberal on strict social issues like abortion and samesex marriage, but also shows their conservative lean regarding immigration. The support
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among queer conservatives for requiring background checks on all gun purchases is fairly
consistent with other respondents in the CCES data set, as well as national polling. 92%
of the

LGBTQ

sample favors background checks, as do 8 1 % of the general conservative

sample. And in 2017, the Pew Research Center found 84% of Americans favor
background checks for private sales and at gun shows (Igielnek and Brown 2 0 1 7).
Also on guns, queer conservatives do not differ much from straight conservatives
when it comes to banning assault rifles. 43% of the latter group favor such weapons
versus the 56% opposed. The Pew Research Center notes 68% of Americans favor
banning assault weapons. The general

LGBTQ populace, however, highly favors banning

these weapons with 73% supporting the proposal.
On immigration, only 27% of the general conservative sample supports granting
legal status to undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as
minors, also known as DREAMers after the proposed DREAM Act to grant them a path
to citizenship. Conservative

LGBTQ people are only a few points more

in favor of this

proposal, and 55% are in favor of identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants,
while 65% of heterosexual conservatives support such a proposal. The general

LGBTQ

sample shows the highest support for undocumented migrants, with 60% favoring
granting legal status to DREAMers and only 27% support identifying and deporting
undocumented immigrants.
It is on the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage where queer conservatives
differentiate greatly from both the general

LGBTQ population and the general

conservative sample. Only 32% of heterosexual conservatives support always allowing
abortion as a matter of choice, versus 52% of the queer conservatives and 77% of the
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general queer sample. Similarly, 6 1 % of straight conservatives support abortion only in
cases of rape, incest, and concerns for the mother's life, whereas 66% of queer
conservatives support such a proposal but only 3 7% of the LGBTQ sample do. The
opposition from the general LGBTQ sample may be because the question asks if they
support abortion

only in the instance of rape, incest, and the life of the mother.

The most startling statistic of the opinion questions, however, is the queer
conservative response to same-sex marriage support. 39% oppose such a proposal. There
does exist among LGBTQ folk some opposition to same-sex marriage, largely because
they either care more about the legal benefits of the unions, or because they view
marriage as patriarchal and heteronormative (Geoghegan 2013). The former argument
could be at the root of many of those conservative LGBTQ people opposed to same-sex
marriage, as respect for marriage as a foundation of society is often an accepted tenant of
conservatism. Indeed, this argument has been used to support same-sex marriage from a
conservative viewpoint (Angelo 2 0 1 5 ; Rauch 2013). Similarly, Geoghegan notes that
many gay couples are concerned more with some form of legal recognition to take
advantage of spousal tax and legal benefits, making civil unions just as useful (2013). It
seems unlikely, however, that one would find arguments against marriage as patriarchal,
misogynistic, and heteronormative among queer conservatives as such an argument has
largely only been found among more radical, liberationist, left-wing queer activists
(Rimmerman 2008).
To derive a possible explanation for this opposition, a simple linear regression
was conducted, the results of which are detailed in Graph 2. The support/oppose same
sex marriage question was tested against common demographic factors often associated

41
with political beliefs such as age, race, gender, education, and income levels.
Interestingly, age is the only statistically significant independent variable. Given that the
age range among the conservative queer sample is decently stratified with strong spikes
among both younger and older members of the group, this outcome is especially curious.
This range is highlighted in Graph

3.

With

74%

of the sample being white, it makes sense

race would not be significant in the model. Yet, the spreads among gender, education,
and income are more like the age spread than the racial demographics.
Graph 2
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Each variable is numbered to signify its scalingfor regression analysis. "Famine" is
family income, and "educ " is highest level ofeducation achieved.
The magnitude of increase on the age variable is also worth mentioning. Not only
is the variable very significant, but its increase shows that as one moves up in age the
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more likely they are to oppose same-sex marriage. By identifying as either somewhat or
strongly conservative, the queer right-wing in this dataset are likely to be more inclined
already to oppose same-sex marriage, possibly for reasons explained above like states'
rights issues or redefining marriage. Augmenting these political beliefs are the societal
attitudes towards queer people as the older generations of queer conservatives were
coming of age and being socialized politically, to say nothing of attitudes towards samesex marriage.
Graph 3
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Unfortunately, because the CCES dataset was not designed specifically for queer
respondents, we have little hard data to explain in further detail why conservative queer
folk believe what they do. This is a limitation to address in future studies. However, what
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the data do present is a larger picture than ever of conservative LGBTQ people's
demographics and political beliefs. On aggregate, they look similar in many ways to both
the LGBTQ population and straight conservatives. Intellectually, it is not hard to wrap
one's head around the notion that not all queer people think the same and that the
mainstream left-leaning LGBTQ rights movement is not a monolith. This data offers for
one of the first times quantifiable justification to believe there are important similarities
and differences between queer conservatives, the general queer community, heterosexual
conservatives, and the American population at large.
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HOMONATIONALISM AND THE QUEER CONSERVATIVE
As has been argued throughout this study, the queer community does not exist nor
think like a monolith. Simply because many LGBTQ people identify as liberal and as
Democrats does not mean that the entire community agrees. Yet, when trying to ascertain
the reasoning behind queer conservatism or explain the rise of far-right beliefs within the
queer community, shrugging off the phenomenon as stemming from a simple diversity of
political opinion does not suffice. As has been noted previously, the evolutions among
the queer right are as important and consequential

as

the debates existing among the

queer left, and no change in political socialization or attitude happens in a vacuum.
Therefore, a broader explanation is necessary to truly attempt to understand the
queer conservative, especially in a post-Obergefell America. To answer, I suggest Jasbir
Puar's theory of homonationalism (2007). At its core, homonationalism describes the
favorable relationship between nationalistic, specifically Islamophobic, ideologies and
the LGBTQ community. One of the keys to this broader theme is the intersection
between the queer community, post-9/ 1 1 foreign policy and national defense, and anti
Islamic conservative politics.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 1 1 , 200 1 , right-wing advocates,
politicians, and pundits have been using the threat of radical Islamic terrorism to bridge
historic divides between the LGBTQ community and the right, and to gain more
supporters from the queer community. Specifically, these advocates are among groups
like the alt-right and other white supremacist and nationalistic organizations. Since 2015,
founder of the alt-right Richard Spencer has been making specific overtures to the
LGBTQ community, and these efforts have only increased since the Pulse shooting
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(Falvey 2 0 1 6 ; "Youth" 2015). Additionally, both the leaders of these movements and
their supporters cite the killings of LGBTQ people at the hands of radical groups like the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL and those affiliated with radical Islamic
terrorist organizations as evidence that Islam is incompatible with Western values like
protecting LGBTQ rights (Greenwald 20 1 6).
However, while tragedies like the killing ofLGBTQ people at the hands ofISIS
and the Pulse nightclub shooting are jarring and emotionally compelling, these incidents,
with hindsight, have proven to be more exaggerated and sensationalist than originally
assumed. OutRight Action International, one of the leading international LGBTQ human
rights organizations, tracked the number of ISIL confirmed killings of queer people from
2014 to 2016. Their research found that 90 LGBTQ people were killed by ISIS fighters in
that two-year span, though it should be noted that they included in their findings the 49
people killed in the Pulse shooting ("Timeline" 2016). Removing the Pulse shooting
brings their total to 4 1 . While the killing of anyone is tragic, 90 murders over the span of
two years does not strike this researcher as actual evidence for an epidemic.
Meanwhile, the Pulse shooting itself provides still greater context to the
difference between compelling political and emotional narratives and the reality of these
events. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, media pundits, activists, and
politicians whipped up a flurry of theories and explanations for the shooting. Within
hours, a cohesive narrative immerged: because the shooter allied himself with ISIL, and
because Pulse is an LGBTQ club, the shooter purposefully chose to target queer people.
Simply put, the shooting was a hate crime (Greenwald 20 1 6).
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Additional speculation came in the form of the common trope of the sexually
confused and frustrated closeted gay man. Patrons of Pulse claimed to have seen the
shooter at the nightclub on a few occasions (Brinkmann 2017). And, the shooter's ex
wife claimed she had wondered about the shooter's sexuality while they were married,
saying: "He would take a long time in front of the mirror, be would often take
pictures of himself, and he made little movements with his body that definitely
made me question things" (Alter 201 6).
And yet, despite these theories becoming the assumed motive of the
shooter, recent findings have proven these theories to be more conspiratorial than
fact. During the trial for the shooter's second wife (she was accused of knowing
about the attack days before it happened), evidence from the FBI revealed there to
be no factual evidence that any of the suggested motives were genuine ( Greenwald
and Hussain 2 0 1 8). The FBI revealed that at no point during the hours-long
standoff at Pulse did the shooter ever spout homophobic justifications, nor is it
believed the shooter even knew Pulse to be a queer club prior to the attack
(Fitzsimons 2 0 1 8 ) . Rather, the shooter cited US military affairs in the Middle East
as his main justification. And, evidence from the night of the assault confirmed the
shooter had originally intended to attack Disney resorts, only to find them too well
protected (Greenwald and Hussain 201 8).
As noted above, the Pulse massacre has been one of the most widely cited
incidents of radical Islamic terrorism used as a form of propaganda to bring queer
people into the right-wing fold. President Trump's high profile remarks on
protecting LGBTQ Americans stems entirely from this line of thinking, as does the
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justification for greater restrictions on Muslims in America and Western Europe.
Alice Weide!, the openly-lesbian leader of the far-right Alternative for
Deutschland (AID) party in Germany referenced the attack in ber campaign rallies
and as justification for a lesbian leading a party whose members are generally anti
LGBTQ (Vlad 2 0 1 7). Additionally, leader of the French far-right party the
National Front Marine Le Pen has employed the same anti-Muslim rhetoric in
overtures to the French LGBTQ community (Wi ldman 2 0 1 7) .
Puar defines homonationalism a s the "transition under way i n how queer
subjects are relating to nati on-states, particularly the United States, from being
figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and
productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families)" (2007, xii). Tn other words,
homonationalism describes how political and power interests align with general
LGBTQ equality to advance xenophobic positions under the guise that foreigners,
specifically Muslims, are supposedly homophobic and are thus incompatible with
the superior egalitarianism of the West.
Recall President Trump's overtures to the LGBTQ community during his
nomination acceptance speech: "As your president, I will do everything in my power
to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful foreign
ideology" (Johnson 20 1 6). Trump's rhetoric, like that of far-right leaders and polemicists
like Richard Spencer, Jack Donovan, and Milo Yiannopoulos, bases his support for the
queer community as entirely against a foreign ideology. While he never explicitly
mentions Islam, remember also that Trump's nomination came only weeks after the Pulse
shooting.
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Of course, homonational.ist overtures to the queer community have existed
prior to the Pulse shooting. Chavez (20 1 5 ) notes that queer support for
immigration reform via the 1 990 Immigration Act spearheaded by the openly gay
Congressman Barney Frank led some on the right to blame Frank and the ..gay
agenda" for the September 1 1 th attacks (Chavez 2 0 1 5). However, a combination of
increased LGBTQ rights (and thus greater inclusion of queer people in American
society), the rise of extreme terrorist groups like ISIS, and the Pulse shooting have
pushed homonational ist j ustifications to the fore.
Puar explains in her foundational book Terrorist Assemblages that as queer
people move from being maligned in society for their personhood or because of
reactions to the AIDS epidemic, they will naturally take a more mainstream hold
in society (2007). With increasing inclusion in the military (tbe main defense
against terrorism), greater civil protections. and the right to marry and adopt
c h i ldren, queer people have moved to this position postulated by Puar. Thus, as
Puar argues, as queer people, especially those of privilege like white gay men, are
included more in society, they will naturally become more concerned with the
wellbeing of the state and the society in which they have adopted and has adopted
them.
As pointed out in the previous section, the overwhelming majority of queer
conservatives are white men. Not only are they the first to be included in the
political society which once excluded them (Schotten 20 1 6), but they are the
perfect candidates for nationalist politics either explicitly or implicitly advocating
for white supremacy at most, and Western/American exceptionalism at best. The
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synthesis of increasing queer rights and backlash against the replacement outgroup
for the

LGBTQ community, Muslims, is ex emplified in the remarks expanded

upon previously by both queer far-right conservatives and heterosexual
nationalists appealing only to a queer person ' s right to life.
Of course, homonationalism has its faults. It is not a catch-all theory for
every queer conservative. However, as I have argued, queer conservatism has
always existed, and even when it finally became public with the advent of the Log
Cabin Republicans, it has existed solidly in traditional conservative thinking. The
novelty of the evolving far-right queer conservative is best explained through
homonationalism, and the many ways increasing populist nationalism bas
influenced American political thought is also exemplified through the queer far
right conservative.
Unfortunately, the interplay between bomonationalism and queer
conservatism is difficult to document. However, since the Pulse shooting, there
has been enough evidence to apply this theory originating from queer theorists to
political science interpretations of changing political beliefs. I argue it is only
through an intersectional approach of traditionally understood demographic
influences on political ideologies and the broader national conversation
surrounding conservatism, terrorism, queer rights. and the inclusivity of all in a
broader American soc i ety can we truly understand the origins and influences

queer conservat ism.

of
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CONCLUSION

Despite the increasing influence of queer Americans on the political
Landscape and the growing research explaining these political phenomenon, I have
argued that not enough attention has been paid to queer conservatism. Tracing its
organizational lineage through the Log Cabin Republicans to growing numbers of
far-right LGBTQ conservatives, this study has documented the many shades of
queer conservatism. Furthermore. data analysis has provided with some of the best
data available a detailed snapshot of not only the general makeup of LGBTQ
conservatives, but some of their political beliefs as well. Finally, a broader
explanation of rising far-right queer conservatism was offered through the theory
of bomonationalism.
This research has not been an attempt to describe in every way queer
conservatism or act as a historical analysis. Rather, the guiding purpose behind
blurring this spectrum is to chip away at a segment of the queer community often
less explored but still critical to the understanding of queer politics. Findings from
this research underscore two important. though perhaps obvious conclusions. First,
queer conservatives share many similarities between both the general (that is to
say, left-leaning) LGBTQ population as well as the mainstream conservative
movement. Second, queer conservatism, like queer politics generally, are quite
complex a n d thus deserving of greater exploration.
These complexities and this research offer important implications. One of
the most frequent criticism heard from queer conservatives is that it is harder to
come out as queer and conservative than it is to come out as queer ("'Gay
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Journalist" 2 0 1 7). I f i t appears this study bas been overly critical of the current
state of research on the full spectrum of sexuality politics, it is unintentional .
Instead, the criticisms and arguments offered here are meant to shed light on a part
of queer politics needed in every level of research into sexuality politics.
Second, queer conservatism cuts to the core of our understanding of
political socialization. Though not previously discussed, some researchers believe
the "coming out" process may be its own form of political socialization - or in
ma ny cases, re-socialization. Coming out as queer c a n l e n d itself to a recalibration
not only of political beliefs but also the communities i n which queer people find
support (Avery 2002; Egan 2 0 1 2 ). Additionally, it's believed the process of a
queer person finding support within their conception of the queer community may
reorient their political compass to be more like those i n their community, thus
possibly explaining why so many in the queer community are left-leaning besides
simple party identification. H owever, if we understand queer conservatives to go
through the same coming out process, how does the coming out process, and
political socialization generally, account for the noticeable number of queer
conservatives?
Above all, however, the interactions between the queer community and far
rigbt political ideologies highlights the extent to which ideologies, especially
reactionary ones, can influence the politics of a society. I f anything . this research
underscores the importance of taking the politics and influences of sexuality both heterosexual and queer - into general and specific accounts of changing
political trends. The political cJout of the queer community is well documented
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(Black et al. 2000; Faderman 2 0 1 5; Gates 2 0 1 1 ; Huang et al 20 1 6). I f we are to
better understand the intersections impacting the political sphere of human
behavior, it is imperative we include every stop along that road.
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